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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–
717z, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
has the power to issue “certificates of public convenience and 
necessity” authorizing private developers to construct, operate, 
and maintain interstate natural gas pipeline projects.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 717f(c).  But before FERC may grant such a 
certificate, it must, in most circumstances, set the matter for a 
hearing and provide reasonable notice to interested parties.  Id. 
§ 717f(c)(1)(B).  If FERC ultimately issues the certificate 
following the requisite hearing, any aggrieved person may seek 
judicial review of its decision—either in the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit or the circuit wherein the 
natural gas company is located or has its principal place of 
business.  Id. § 717r(b).  The statute provides that the chosen 
court of appeals then has “exclusive” jurisdiction “to affirm, 
modify, or set aside” FERC’s order.  Id. § 717r(b), (d)(1).  Prior 
to seeking review in the relevant court of appeals, however, the 
aggrieved party must, within thirty days of the issuance of the 
certificate, apply for rehearing before FERC.  Id. § 717r(a).  
Anyone who fails to first seek rehearing before FERC is 
statutorily barred from later seeking judicial review.  See id.  
 In this case, the Appellants are the Adorers of the Blood 
of Christ (the “Adorers”), a vowed religious order of Roman 
Catholic women that owns a parcel of land in Columbia, 
Pennsylvania affected by FERC’s decision to issue a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity to Transcontinental Gas 
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Pipe Line Company, LLC (“Transco”), authorizing the 
company to construct a roughly two-hundred-mile-long 
pipeline (“Pipeline Project” or “Project”).  The Adorers object 
to the use of their land as part of the Project, explaining that 
their deeply-held religious beliefs require that they care for the 
land in a manner that protects and preserves the Earth as God’s 
creation.  But despite receiving notice of the proposed project, 
the Adorers never raised this objection before FERC.  Instead, 
over five months after FERC granted Transco the certificate, 
the Adorers filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, raising a claim under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  
The District Court promptly dismissed the Adorers’ complaint, 
concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction in light of 
the NGA’s specific provisions addressing judicial review of 
FERC orders.   
 On appeal, the Adorers contend that the District Court 
erred because their RFRA claim raises a federal question, over 
which the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We disagree, and hold that a RFRA cause of action, brought by 
invoking a court’s general federal question jurisdiction, does 
not abrogate or provide an exception to a specific and exclusive 
jurisdictional provision prescribing a particular procedure for 
judicial review of an agency’s action.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the order of the District Court.  
I1 
                                                 
 1 “In an appeal from a grant . . . of a motion to dismiss 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1), this Court reviews only whether the allegations on the 
face of the complaint, taken as true, allege sufficient facts to 
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A 
 The Pipeline Project proposed by Transco consists of 
199.5 miles of new pipeline in Pennsylvania connecting to 
existing pipelines running to South Carolina.  The Pipeline 
Project is marketed as potentially supplying more than seven 
million American homes with enough natural gas to meet their 
daily needs by connecting natural gas producing Pennsylvania 
regions to markets in the mid-Atlantic and southeastern states.   
 The Pipeline Project consists of many subsections, 
including “Central Penn Line South,” a proposed 127.3-mile 
section of the Project that will run from Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania to Columbia, Pennsylvania, with a forty-two-
inch diameter capable of transporting 1.7 dekatherms (billion 
cubic feet) of natural gas per day, and a maximum operating 
pressure of 1,480 pounds per square inch.  The subsection 
would facilitate the extraction, harnessing, transportation, and 
use of natural gas.  The Pipeline Project would run through the 
Adorers’ property in Columbia, Pennsylvania.   
B 
 On July 29, 2014, FERC published a Notice of Intent to 
Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Planned 
Atlantic Sunrise Expansion, Request for Comments on 
Environmental Issues, and Notice of Public Scoping Meetings 
(“NOI”) in the Federal Register, see 79 Fed. Reg. 44,023 
(2014), and mailed it to nearly 2,500 interested parties, 
                                                 
invoke the jurisdiction of the District Court.”  Oss Nokalva, 
Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
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including affected property owners, to provide notice of the 
proposed Pipeline Project.  The NOI provided a synopsis of the 
Pipeline Project and a preliminary list of issues identified by 
FERC’s staff.  It also described the environmental review 
process, invited written comments on issues that should be 
addressed, listed the date and location of four public meetings 
to be held in the area surrounding the Project, and provided a 
deadline of August 18, 2014, for all comments.   
 According to FERC, it received over six hundred 
written comments from various interested parties, and ninety-
three speakers provided comments at the scoping meetings 
held between August 4 and 7, 2014.  The Adorers did not 
provide a written comment or attend any one of these meetings. 
 Transco filed its project application with FERC for a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for the Pipeline 
Project on March 31, 2015.  On October 22, 2015, FERC 
mailed letters to landowners potentially affected by the 
proposed Pipeline Project.  The letter briefly described 
proposed project reroutes under consideration, invited newly 
affected landowners to participate in the environmental review 
process, and provided a special thirty-day limited scoping 
period.  Among the recipients of the October 22, 2015 letter 
were the Adorers, who failed to respond to the letter. 
 The Adorers are “an ecclesial group of women living in 
community” and practicing their deeply-held religious 
convictions, App. 28, “whose religious practice includes 
protecting and preserving creation, which they believe is a 
revelation of God,” App. 24.  They believe that “God calls 
humans to treasure land as a gift of beauty and sustenance that 
should not be used in an excessive or harmful way.”  App. 24.  
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Part of their practice is to “protect, preserve and treasure the 
land that [they] own.”  App. 24. 
 The Adorers own the parcel of land in Columbia, 
Pennsylvania that is at issue here.  The land has been used to 
sponsor the St. Anne’s Retirement Community, and for 
growing crops by local farmers.  The Adorers assert that their 
intentional decision on how to use the land “is an integral part 
of exercising their well-established and deeply-held religious 
beliefs as active and engaged stewards of God’s earth.”  App. 
32.   
 In 2015, the Adorers followed an encyclical2 letter titled 
“Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for our 
Common Home,” written by Pope Francis.  In the letter, Pope 
Francis provides a comprehensive theological basis that, as an 
act of religious belief and practice, members of the Roman 
Catholic Church must preserve the Earth as God’s creation.  
Specifically, Pope Francis identifies that climate change based, 
among other things, “on the great concentration of greenhouse 
gases related mainly as a result of human activity” and 
“aggravated by a model of development based on the intensive 
use of fossil fuels . . . is a global problem.”  Pope Francis, 
Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care for our 
Common Home 18–19, 20–21 (2015).  Accordingly, the letter 
makes a calling “to devise larger strategies to halt 
                                                 
 2 An encyclical letter is a letter sent by a bishop or high 
church official that treats a matter of grave or timely 
importance and is intended for extensive circulation.  
Encyclical, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 747 
(4th ed. 1976). 
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environmental degradation and to encourage a ‘culture of care’ 
which permeates all of society.”  Id. at 166–67. 
 On May 5, 2016, FERC issued a draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (“EIS”) addressing the issues raised during 
the scoping period and up to its publication.  Notice of the draft 
EIS was published in the Federal Register on May 12, 2016, 
and mailed to the affected parties, several environmental 
entities, as well as to additional affected parties that were added 
after the issuance of the NOI.  FERC then held four public 
comment meetings between June 13 and June 16, 2016, where 
approximately 203 speakers provided comments regarding the 
draft EIS.  FERC also received over 560 written comments 
from affected parties regarding the draft EIS.  As a result of the 
oral and written comments, FERC postponed the issuance of 
the final EIS, and nearly 100 additional comments were filed 
related to the Pipeline Project.  The Adorers failed to provide a 
comment or otherwise participate in any of these fora. 
 On February 3, 2017, FERC issued an “Order Issuing 
Certificate” to Transco authorizing the construction and 
operation of the Pipeline Project.  Among other things, the 
Order granted Transco the right to take private property on the 
Pipeline Project by eminent domain, should landowners refuse 
to voluntarily convey a right to use their land.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
717f(h).   
 Based on the issuance of the Order, the Adorers refused 
to grant Transco an easement on the land to begin 
construction.3  On April 14, 2017, Transco initiated 
                                                 
 3 The Adorers aver that they have “consistently and 
repeatedly denied all monetary offers from Transco to acquire 
their Property and made it clear that, as a matter of religious 
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condemnation proceedings against them in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, pursuant to the NGA and Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 71.1.  Two months later, given that the Adorers 
had failed to answer the complaint or file any sort of responsive 
motion, Transco filed an “Emergency Motion for Default 
Judgment and for Possession of Rights of Way in Unopposed 
Condemnation Action,” and soon after moved for a 
preliminary injunction for possession of those rights of way, 
which the Adorers opposed.  The District Court then issued an 
order granting Transco’s right to condemn the relevant section 
of the Adorers’ land on July 7.  On August 23, the District 
Court entered a preliminary injunction granting Transco access 
to and the rights of way on the Adorers’ land upon the posting 
of a bond in the amount of $329,220 (which Transco paid one 
week later).  
 The Adorers did not object, appeal or seek rehearing 
regarding any order issued related to these condemnation 
proceedings. 
 Instead, on July 14, 2017, a week after the District Court 
issued the order granting Transco’s right to condemn, the 
Adorers filed their own complaint against FERC in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory judgment, 
alleging that FERC violated their rights under RFRA, and 
additionally seeking injunctive relief preventing the Pipeline 
Project from running across their land.  They later filed an 
                                                 
conviction, no amount of money would change their mind.”  
Adorers Br. 14. 
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amended complaint reiterating the same claims, listing 
additional plaintiffs, and adding Transco as a defendant.4 
 In the amended complaint, the Adorers claimed that 
allowing Transco to complete the Pipeline Project would 
interfere with their ability to use their land in a manner 
consistent with their religious beliefs.  In particular, the 
Adorers alleged that the drilling and subsequent extraction of 
natural gas from wells in the land would cause leakage of 
methane.  This leakage, they contended, would contribute to 
global warming in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs.  
The Adorers also alleged that the expansion of natural gas 
would be harmful to the environment by accelerating global 
warming and consequently harming the Earth and humans. 
 On September 28, 2017, the District Court in the RFRA 
action granted FERC’s and Transco’s motions to dismiss for 
                                                 
 4 We need not reach the issue of whether a holder of a 
section 7 certificate fully assumes the role of a state actor when 
exercising eminent domain rights.  While RFRA, by its terms, 
only applies to state actors, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 
(“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion . . . .”), Transco did not raise a state-actor 
defense in its briefs or even invoke one in response to 
questioning at oral argument, see Oral Argument at 30:22–
31:25, Adorers of the Blood of Christ v. F.E.R.C., No. 17-3163, 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings.  Thus, 
the issue of whether an entity in Transco’s position qualifies as 
a state actor—which we have previously recognized is an open 
question in our circuit, see Goadby v. Phila. Elec. Co., 639 F.2d 
117, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981)—is one we will leave for another 
day. 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The court held that RFRA 
did not allow the Adorers to circumvent the specific procedure 
prescribed by the NGA for challenging a FERC order.  In other 
words, the Adorers’ RFRA claim did not change the basic fact 
that, under the NGA, “no entity may seek judicial review of a 
FERC order unless it first sought rehearing from the agency.”  
App. 8.  Because the Adorers had failed to seek FERC 
rehearing, the court concluded that it was foreclosed from 
hearing their claims.  The Adorers then filed this appeal. 
II5 
 According to the Adorers, the District Court erred in 
dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
because RFRA grants them a statutory right to assert an 
appropriate claim in district court.  The NGA, they contend, 
cannot be used to foreclose that statutory right because 
Congress explicitly provisioned RFRA to supersede all other 
Federal law.  Thus, to the extent that RFRA and the NGA 
conflict, the Adorers argue that the latter must yield.  While we 
agree that the NGA would have to necessarily yield to RFRA 
if the two statutes indeed conflicted, we conclude that the two 
statutes do not conflict.  Rather, the NGA merely provides for 
complementary procedural requirements that a claimant must 
                                                 
 5 “[E]very federal appellate court has a special 
obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but 
also that of the lower courts in a cause under review[.]’”  Bruce 
v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 
541 (1986)).  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
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adhere to when exercising their RFRA right to a “judicial 
proceeding.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). 
 
 “When reviewing an order dismissing a claim for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, we exercise plenary review over 
legal conclusions and review findings of fact for clear error.”  
White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 We begin by examining the two statutory schemes that 
the Adorers argue are in conflict.  Section 7 of the NGA grants 
FERC the authority to approve or deny the construction of 
interstate natural gas pipelines.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717f.  Indeed, 
before a private developer can begin construction on any 
pipeline project, FERC must grant the developer a “certificate 
of public convenience and necessity,” id. § 717f(c)(1)(A)—
also referred to as a “section 7 certificate” or a “certificate.”  
FERC may grant a certificate only upon a finding that the 
project at issue will serve the public interest of convenience 
and necessity.  Id. § 717f(e).  FERC may also “attach to the 
issuance of the certificate . . . reasonable terms and conditions 
as the public convenience and necessity may require.”  Id. § 
717f(e).   
 Once FERC has issued a certificate to a developer, the 
certificate holder has the ability to acquire “the necessary right-
of-way to construct, operate and maintain a pipe line or pipe 
lines” from unwilling landowners by eminent domain.  Id. § 
717f(h).  As such, any party who is “aggrieved” by a FERC 
certificate may seek redress by petitioning the federal court of 
appeals, which would have “exclusive” jurisdiction “to affirm, 
modify, or set aside” the certificate, provided that the party first 
seek rehearing before FERC.  Id. § 717r(a)-(d); id. § 717r(b) 
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(“Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an 
order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain 
a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United 
States . . . by filing in such court, within sixty days after the 
order of the Commission upon application for rehearing[.]”). 
 RFRA, meanwhile, instructs that the “[g]overnment 
shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability” 
unless the government demonstrates that the burden “is the 
least restrictive means” to further a “compelling government 
interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b).  The statute’s judicial 
relief provision further provides that “[a] person whose 
religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section 
may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial 
proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the 
government.”  Id. § 2000bb-1(c). 
III 
A 
 
 The Adorers contend that the plain language of this 
judicial relief provision grants them a statutory right to assert 
their RFRA claim in district court.  We disagree.  The NGA is 
a detailed statute, setting forth specific provisions on the 
procedure by which approval and subsequent review of a 
pipeline project may be attained.  The statute provides that 
“[a]ny party . . . aggrieved by an order issued by the 
Commission . . . may obtain a review of such order in the court 
of appeals of the United States . . . by filing in such court, 
within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon 
application for rehearing.”  15 U.S.C. § 717r(b).  Once issued, 
the FERC order was undoubtedly under the exclusive purview 
of the NGA’s provision for appellate review of the circuit 
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courts of appeals.  See id.  RFRA, on the other hand, provides 
that “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief 
against the government.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (emphasis 
added).  Nowhere does the text specifically confer jurisdiction 
to the federal district courts to hear RFRA claims.6    
 As such, the NGA’s procedural regime is controlling 
here.  It explicitly states that jurisdiction is “exclusive” with 
“the court[s] of appeals of the United States.”  15 U.S.C. § 
717r(b).  Moreover, the statute’s exhaustion provision, 
requiring that objections to FERC’s order be “urged before the 
Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is 
reasonable ground for failure so to do” before appellate review, 
                                                 
 6 Were we to interpret RFRA’s reference to a “judicial 
proceeding” as necessarily requiring a district court hearing, 
we would have to conclude that the NGA unlawfully conflicted 
with RFRA.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (“This chapter 
applies to all Federal law, and the implementation of that law, 
whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or 
after November 16, 1993.”).  But the NGA’s procedural 
requirements, which permit parties to seek review in a court of 
appeals following an initial agency hearing, qualify as a 
“judicial proceeding” under RFRA.  Although an agency 
proceeding alone would not qualify as such a “judicial 
proceeding,” we conclude that the NGA’s “FERC + Court of 
Appeals” framework so qualifies.  In this sense, then, the NGA 
and RFRA do not conflict with each other.  Rather, the NGA 
simply lays out what procedural rules a claimant must adhere 
to when exercising their RFRA right to a “judicial proceeding” 
in the pipeline context. 
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id., makes clear Congress’ intent to confer exclusive 
jurisdiction to the NGA by a highly reticulated statute 
nullifying any procedural alternatives an aggrieved party may 
otherwise have.  Indeed, the NGA is the exclusive remedy for 
matters relating to the construction of interstate natural gas 
pipelines.  It forms the paradigm by which FERC operates in 
matters related to interstate natural gas pipelines.  By failing to 
avail themselves of the protections thereunder, the Adorers 
have foreclosed judicial review of their substantive RFRA 
claims. 
 Besides, even if the NGA did not expressly preclude 
jurisdiction in this case, we would nonetheless find that it did 
so implicitly under the two-step framework provided in 
Thunder Basin Coal v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).  At the first 
step, the court asks whether Congress’ intent to preclude 
district court jurisdiction is “fairly discernible in the statutory 
scheme,” based on an examination of the statute’s text, 
structure, and purpose.  Id. at 207.  The second step, in turn, 
asks whether plaintiffs’ claims “are of the type Congress 
intended to be reviewed within this statutory structure.”  Id. at 
212.  At this stage the court considers three factors:  (1) 
whether the statutory scheme “foreclose[s] all meaningful 
judicial review;” (2) the extent to which the plaintiff’s claims 
are “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provision; and 
(3) whether “agency expertise could be brought to bear on the 
. . . questions presented.”  Id. at 212–13. 
 Here, Congress’ intent to vest jurisdiction in circuit 
courts is “fairly discernible in the” NGA.  See Thunder Basin, 
510 U.S. at 207 (setting forth first prong of two-part test).  Only 
“the court of appeals of the United States” where the natural 
gas company is located or has its principal place of business or 
the District of Columbia Circuit may “affirm, modify, or set 
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aside [a FERC] order in whole or in part.”  § 717r(b).  By 
challenging the permissibility of the Pipeline Project under 
RFRA, the Adorers are seeking to “modify or set aside” 
FERC’s order—a matter the NGA places in the “exclusive” 
purview of the court of appeals, only after administrative 
exhaustion. 
 At step two, we think the Adorers’ claims “are of the 
type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory 
structure.”  Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212.  First, the statutory 
authority, the NGA, does not foreclose all meaningful judicial 
review because it vests the courts of appeals with jurisdiction 
to review FERC orders.  See id. at 212–13.  Second, the claims 
asserted here are not “wholly collateral” because they “inhere 
in the controversy;” that is, if the Adorers are successful in their 
administrative challenge, the FERC order will be modified or 
set aside.  Id.  Finally, although the constitutional claims may 
be outside of FERC’s expertise, this is tempered by the court 
of appeals’s review, which regularly resolves constitutional 
issues.  See Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 420 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“[T]he [Thunder Basin] Court’s fundamental point, we 
think, was that both statutory and constitutional claims could 
be meaningfully addressed in the court of appeals.”); see also 
Elgin v. Dep’t of Treas., 567 U.S. 1, 19 (2012) (“We see 
nothing extraordinary in a statutory scheme that vests 
reviewable factfinding authority in a non-Article III entity that 
has jurisdiction over an action but cannot finally decide the 
legal question to which the facts pertain.”). 
 We are therefore not convinced that “the plain language 
of RFRA” grants the Adorers, Adorers Br. 22, the statutory 
right to assert their RFRA claim in a federal district court.  As 
the Supreme Court has explained, the general “principle” that, 
“when federal law creates a private right of action . . . district 
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courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331,” is 
one that does not “endure[]” where “Congress divests federal 
courts of their § 1331 adjudicatory authority.”  Mims v. Arrow 
Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378–79 (2012).  Thus, we 
reject the Adorers’ contention that the District Court 
committed an error of law when it applied the provisions of the 
NGA to conclude it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
their substantive RFRA claims.7 
                                                 
 7 This analysis is consistent with our decision in Francis 
v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007).  In Francis, we noted 
that “Congress did not intend RFRA to subsume other statutory 
schemes,” and thereby acknowledged that “nothing in RFRA 
alters the exclusive nature of Title VII with regard to 
employees’ claims” because of “Title VII’s exclusive and 
comprehensive scheme.”  Id. at 270.  The Court concluded that, 
despite the plaintiff’s attempt to invoke a RFRA claim, Title 
VII affords plaintiffs “the exclusive remedy for job-related 
claims of federal religious discrimination.”  Id. at 272.  
 Judge Stapleton’s Concurrence in Francis, with which 
the Majority did “not disagree”, id. at 272 n.7, is of particular 
relevance here.  Judge Stapleton relied on Brown v. General 
Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) to highlight the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in enunciating that Title VII 
provides “the exclusive, pre-emptive [sic] administrative and 
judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment 
discrimination.”  Id. at 272 (Stapleton, J., concurring) (quoting 
Brown, 425 U.S. at 829).  As Judge Stapleton observed, the 
Supreme Court opined that Title VII should supersede general 
statutes under the canon of statutory interpretation that resolves 
tension between specific and general statutes, favoring specific 
statutes.  Francis, 505 F.3d at 272 (Stapleton, J., concurring).  
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 Our sister circuits also agree.  In American Energy 
Corporation v. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that the NGA’s reticulated procedure 
provides that the “relevant court of appeals . . . has ‘exclusive’ 
jurisdiction ‘to affirm, modify, or set aside [FERC’s] order in 
whole or in part’” and that “no entity may seek judicial review 
of a FERC order unless it first sought rehearing from the 
agency.”  622 F.3d 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citations 
omitted).  The court emphasized that “[e]xclusive means 
exclusive, and the [NGA] nowhere permits an aggrieved party 
otherwise to pursue collateral review of a FERC certificate in 
state court or federal district court.”  Id.; see also La Voz Radio 
de la Comunidad v. F.C.C., 223 F.3d 313, 319 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that RFRA “does not provide that the ‘judicial 
proceeding’ must be in the district court as opposed to a 
designated court of appeals” and reasoning that “Congress has 
equipped the FCC with an impressive arsenal of remedies,” of 
which the “effectiveness . . . would be largely nullified if 
[plaintiffs] could simply run to the district court and enjoin the 
FCC from utilizing them”); Gen. Fin. Corp. v. F.T.C., 700 F.2d 
366, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) (“You may not bypass the specific 
method that Congress has provided for reviewing adverse 
agency action simply by suing the agency in federal district 
court under 1331 or 1337; the specific statutory method, if 
adequate, is exclusive.”).   
                                                 
In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that, as a practical 
matter, Title VII’s remedial provisions would be entirely 
undermined “if a plaintiff could circumvent its procedural 
requirements by ‘the simple expedient of putting a different 
label on the pleadings.’”  Id. (quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 833). 
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 Indeed, the Supreme Court has long held that the 
Federal Power Act’s (“FPA”), statutory review scheme, 16 
U.S.C. § 825l, which is materially identical to the NGA’s,8 
“necessarily preclude[s] de novo litigation between the parties 
of all issues inhering in the controversy, and all other modes of 
judicial review,” and that challenges brought in the district 
court outside that scheme are therefore “impermissible 
collateral attacks.”  City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 
357 U.S. 320, 336, 341 (1958); see also Me. Council of the Atl. 
Salmon Fed. v. Nat’l Me. Fisheries Serv., 858 F.3d 690, 693 
(1st Cir. 2017) (Souter, J., sitting by designation) (“The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the jurisdiction provided by 
[the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional provision] is 
‘exclusive,’ not only to review the terms of the specific FERC 
order, but over any issue ‘inhering in the controversy.’” 
(quoting City of Tacoma, 357 U.S. at 336)). 
 Thus, the District Court did not err in concluding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   
B 
 The Adorers further claim that, even if they had 
indulged the administrative process, they could not have 
asserted their rights under RFRA within the NGA because they 
would have had “to have anticipated a possible RFRA violation 
and affirmatively acted to become a party to a private third 
                                                 
 8 The FPA, 16 U.S.C. § 791a, is a statutory scheme 
recognized as “substantially identical” to the NGA and subject 
to “interchangeabl[e]” precedent.  Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 
U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981). 
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party’s administrative application.”  Adorers Br. 41-42.  We 
disagree.9 
 The Adorers’ contention is unavailing because FERC 
may hear any claim raised before it—even potential violations 
of federal law.  There is no inherent inhibition to FERC hearing 
a potential claim in the first instance because it is statutorily 
granted the authority to hear any claim from an affected party 
when raised timely.  It may adjudicate these claims in a way it 
believes appropriate.  If an affected party disagrees with the 
adjudication of her claim, she has the opportunity for direct 
appeal before a federal court of appeals.10 
                                                 
 9 Our conclusion here should not be interpreted as 
precluding the filing of a proper freestanding due process claim 
pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).  
“The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, 
under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must 
be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.”  Id. 
at 348.  This is consistent with Thunder Basin’s long-standing 
observation that a district court may hear claims that are 
considered “‘wholly collateral’ to a statute’s review provisions 
and outside the agency’s expertise,” where a finding of 
preclusion potentially forecloses all meaningful judicial 
review.  510 U.S. at 213–14 (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 
U.S. 602, 618 (1984)).  When such a claim arises, it “may be 
challenged in a district court,” as long as it is “entirely 
collateral” and “the petitioner ha[s] made a colorable showing 
that full postdeprivation relief could not be obtained.”  Id. at 
214 (citations omitted). 
 10 As proof of this process, Transco submitted an Order 
of Rehearing issued by FERC related to the Pipeline Project 
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(“28(j) Letter”).  The 28(j) Letter indicates that the plaintiffs in 
that matter requested rehearing on an order issued by FERC 
authorizing construction and operation of the Pipeline Project, 
which challenged several potential violations of federal laws.  
As a result of following the NGA’s procedural process, the 
plaintiffs’ claims will be heard by the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  In our view, the 28(j) Letter provides 
evidence that, when the procedural process of the NGA is 
adhered to, all issues—whether dispositive or potential—may 
be addressed at the agency level.  If a party is not satisfied with 
the result at that level, she may seek review in a court of 
appeals—as the parties in the 28(j) Letter have done.  Had the 
Adorers likewise taken advantage of the NGA’s regime, we see 
no reason to conclude that they would not have had an 
opportunity to review their substantive RFRA claims on two 
levels:  at the administrative and the appellate level. 
 Moreover, just as an objector has a fundamental right to 
raise concerns prompted by religious beliefs at the 
administrative level, so, too, FERC bears a commensurate 
responsibility to carefully consider those objections and to treat 
respectfully the expression of sincerely-held religious beliefs.  
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (an objector is “entitled to a 
neutral decisionmaker who w[ill] give full and fair 
consideration to h[er] religious objection”).  Likewise, 
although we hold today that such objections must be raised in 
the administrative forum under FERC’s exclusive regime to 
preserve appellate review, nothing in this opinion should be 
construed to call into question the sincerity of the deeply-held 
religious beliefs expressed by the Adorers. 
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 If the Adorers had participated in the administrative 
process, FERC may have denied or modified the conditions of 
Transco’s certificate.  Or, if FERC failed to do so, the 
reviewing court of appeals may have ruled in the Adorers’ 
favor.  Under these circumstances, the Adorers would have, at 
the very least, had the opportunity to seek the relief they so 
desire today.11  But because they failed to engage with the 
NGA’s procedural regime, we are without jurisdiction to hear 
the Adorers’ claims.12 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a claim under 
RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c), brought pursuant to the 
general jurisdictional grant of a federal question under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, does not abrogate or provide an exception to a 
                                                 
 11 While RFRA expressly provides for damages, see 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1, it appears that the NGA circumscribes 
FERC’s authority to issue a ruling on the merits of a certificate 
of public convenience and necessity, see 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e), 
and the Court of Appeals is similarly limited to “affirming, 
modifying, or setting aside” the certificate, id. § 717r(b).  Thus, 
the ability of a RFRA claimant to receive damages through the 
NGA process may indeed bear on “whether the claims can be 
afforded meaningful review.”  Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207.  
The Adorers did not request damages in their complaint; hence, 
we need not reach this issue today. 
 12 Because we hold that neither the District Court nor 
this Court have jurisdiction to adjudicate the Adorers’ 
substantive RFRA claim, we need not address their alternative 
arguments.   
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specific and exclusive jurisdictional provision prescribed by 
Congress for judicial review of an agency’s action.  
Accordingly, we shall affirm the order of the District Court 
granting Transco’s and FERC’s motions to dismiss. 
